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THE DERAILMENT OF SECTION 13(D) LIABILITY
AFTER CSX V CHILDREN'S INVESTMENT FUND: AN
ARGUMENT FOR MAINTAINING THE BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR SECTION 13(D)
DISCLOSURE
Robert T. Law+
Innovation on Wall Street has led to the proliferation of sophisticated
financial products, the most notable being derivatives.1 A derivative, in the
financial product context, is a two-party transaction with "a contract that either
allows or obligates one of the parties (the 'end-user') to buy or sell an asset.",2
The prominence of derivatives in the current economic climate has heightened
concerns about their regulation because derivatives are considered "novel,
complex, and opaque."3  This heightened regulatory concern has centered
primarily on one type of derivative known as a "swap.'A In a swap transaction,
"one party agrees to provide a sequence of cash flows and in return the other
party provides a different sequence of cash flows." 5  Despite a seemingly
straight-forward definition, financial derivatives are highly complex
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1. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1458-59 (1993) [hereinafter Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives]; see also Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern
Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273,
1274 (1991) ("Complex new financial products now allow virtually every manner of fluctuation
and cash flow to be hedged against, invested in, and bought and sold.").
2. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 1, at 1464; see also Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("Derivatives transactions may be
based on the value of foreign currency, U.S. Treasury bonds, stock indexes, or interest rates. The
values of these underlying financial instruments are determined by market forces, such as
movements in interest rates. Within the broad panoply of derivatives transactions are numerous
innovative financial instruments whose objectives may include a hedge against market risks,
management of assets and liabilities, or lowering of funding costs; derivatives may also be used
as speculation for profit."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a
"derivative" as "[a] financial instrument whose value depends on or is derived from the
performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity").
3. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 1, at 1460.
4. Id. at 1459-61.
5. Id. at 1467; see also SUSAN Ross MARKi, DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 27
(1991).
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instruments with possible market impacts that can catch even the most
successful investors off guard.
For example, derivatives were directly responsible for shocking the
investment world on October 28, 2008, when Volkswagen (VW) briefly
surpassed energy giant Exxon Mobil as the world's most valuable company.
6
On October 26, Porsche, VW's significantly smaller rival, disclosed that it had
essentially cornered the market of VW shares through a combination of stock
and a type of derivative known as a cash-settled option.7 Porsche was able to
build its substantial position in VW without raising the awareness of other
market participants because derivatives such as cash-settled options do not
need to be disclosed to regulators. 8 Unaware of Porsche's derivative holdings,
other investors were short-selling VW shares--essentially betting that the price
would go down.9 Because demand exceeded supply, VW's stock price soared
as short sellers attempted to hedge, or minimize, their losses by buying shares
as quickly as possible.10 According to some market estimates, Porsche stood
poised to gain billions of euros from its VW derivatives.11 While investors like
Porsche praise derivatives, 12 others call for stricter disclosure rules, arguing
that derivatives are secretive and deceptive. 13 The prominence of sophisticated
derivatives in the modem market gives rise to the current legal debate: whether
transacting in cash-settled derivatives triggers federal securities law reporting
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).
Although numerous provisions may require disclosure of derivatives in one
form or another, this Comment will limit its discussion to the requirements
under the 1934 Act's section 13(d) beneficial-ownership provision and
corresponding Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. The section
6. Frank Ahrens, The World's Most Valuable Company, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2008, at DI
(reporting that, for a short period of time, VW's value exceeded $370 billion, compared to Exxon
Mobil's value of $343 billion).
7. Mike Esterl & Gregory Zucker, VW Shares To Be Probed After Porsche Disclosures,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2008, at C1. Porsche disclosed "that it had boosted its VW stake to 42.6%
and held so-called cash-settled options linked to another 31.5% of VW's shares." Id Cash-
settled options allow the buyer (Porsche) to receive the cash difference between the options'
purchase price (or strike price), and the market price of the shares when the options are exercised.
Id. For example, if Porsche buys a cash-settled option for $100 and exercises, or cashes in, the
option when the market price is $300, Porsche receives $200.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Meanwhile, the hedge funds that incorrectly bet on VW's stock price falling lost
over $20 billion. Id.
12. Id. A Porsche spokesman explained that Porsche is "a very small company buying into
a very big company [VW]. That is not something you can afford if everybody is able to read your
strategy in the newspaper." Id.
13. Id. ("DWS, the asset management arm of Deutsche Bank AG, Germany's largest bank,
criticized Porsche for a 'lack of transparency' and called on the country's regulators to tighten
disclosure rules.").
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13(d) disclosure requirements mandate that individuals in a position to alter
control of a company disclose such ownership to the SEC and the target
corporation. 14 According to the SEC's beneficial-ownership rules, "control"
requires either voting or disposition rights over a security.' 5  The problem
created by derivatives--especially swaps-arises when one party to the swap
transaction hedges its exposure by subsequently purchasing actual shares.
Under current securities law, such swap transactions do not confer beneficial
ownership on the non-hedging party, 16 and therefore, the majority of
jurisdictions only require section 13(d) disclosure from the hedging party.17
However, the Southern District of New York--departing from this established
approach-held a non-hedging party bound by the section 13(d) disclosure
requirements reasoning that even if the non-hedging party was not a beneficial
owner under SEC Rule 13d-3(a), it may nevertheless be deemed a beneficial
owner under Rule 13d-3(b)." This departure is significant because the
Southern District of New York has jurisdiction over Wall Street-the primary
location for financial derivatives transactions.
This Comment examines and analyzes the split between the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third Circuits and the Southern
District of New York. In Part I, this Comment begins by exploring section
13(d) of the Williams Act, the corresponding SEC rules, and the case-law
application of beneficial ownership. All three areas demonstrate that beneficial
ownership requires actual control over shares. Next, this Comment analyzes
the beneficial-ownership evasion and group-formation rules and their role in
section 13(d) disclosure. This Comment also develops the substantive issues
surrounding the judicial split by examining the uncertainty of modem
sophisticated financial instruments. Part II of this Comment addresses the
circuit split by critiquing the weakness in the holding of CSX Corp. v.
Children's Investment Fund and developing strengths of the majority
approach. This section argues that the SEC, and not the courts, is in the best
position to reform beneficial-ownership application, but concludes that no
action is currently needed. In Part III, this Comment further exposes CSX's
14. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2-4, 8 (1968) [hereinafter H.R. 1711]; see also Wellman v.
Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Section 13(d) was designed to alert investors in
securities markets to potential changes in corporate control and to provide them with an
opportunity to evaluate the effect of these potential changes."); Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 5
SECURITIES REGULATION 2162 (1990) ("The legislative history thus shows that Congress was
intent upon regulating takeover bidders, theretofore operating covertly, in order to protect the
shareholders of target companies .... ").
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.
16. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. Cf CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund,
562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 538-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (suggesting, in dicta, that swaps do confer
beneficial ownership on the non-hedging party to a swap transaction).
17. See, e.g., Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351,
1363-66 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 140-48 (3d Cir. 2001).
18. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
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weaknesses by examining the unintended consequences of imposing the
section 13(d) disclosure requirements on non-beneficial owners. Finally, this
Comment concludes by urging the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit to limit CSXto its facts; in the alternative, it urges the SEC, in
its official interpretative capacity, to reject CSX's departure from the
established approach.
I. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW AND THE WILLIAMS ACT: A FOCUS ON
DISCLOSURE
In the 1960s, corporate management was under fire as aggressive investors
took advantage of the bullish market and loopholes in disclosure requirements
to take over companies. 19 Congress responded to this perceived problem by
passing the Williams Act in 1968.20 Utilizing SEC guidance in crafting the
legislation,2 1 Congress took "extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."22 As
a result, Congress amended the 1934 Act with the addition of section 13(d),
requiring individuals in a position to alter control of a company to disclose
such ownership to the SEC and the target corporation. 23 Accordingly, the goal
of section 13(d) was "to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation
or accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might
19. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION 717-18 (10th ed. 2003); see also GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir.
1971) ("The 1960's on Wall Street may best be remembered for the pyrotechnics of corporate
takeovers and the phenomenon of conglomeration. .... [B]efore the enactment of the Williams
Act there were no provisions regulating cash tender offers or other techniques of securing
corporate control."). Other investors, unaware of these positions, were effectively investing
blindly in corporations without the knowledge of potential shifts in corporate control. LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 2160 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22
(1977).
20. See Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 454 (1968). Senator
Harrison A. Williams, namesake of the bill, asserted that the gaps in the disclosure requirements
of the securities laws needed to be filled to guarantee that:
All will be able to deal in the securities markets knowing that all of the pertinent facts
are available. This is the premise under which our securities markets are supposed to
work. Following this premise they have thrived and prospered over the years. Now is
the time to eliminate the last remaining areas where full disclosure is necessary but not
yet available.
Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on See. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 3 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Williams, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Sec.).
21. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 2158-63 (reviewing the Williams Act's
legislative history).
22. 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); see also H.R. 1711, supra
note 14, at 4; S. REP. No. 550, at 3 (1967) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter S.R. 550].
23. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Section 13(d) was
designed to alert investors in securities markets to potential changes in corporate control and
provide them with an opportunity to evaluate these potential changes.").
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represent a potential shift in corporate control. 24  Thus, Congress intended
Section 13(d) to function as a shield for investors rather than as a sword for
management2 5
A. Defining Beneficial Ownership
1. Section 13(d)
Section 13(d) requires any person who, directly or indirectly, acquires
"beneficial ownership" of more than five percent of specified "equity
securit[ies]" to disclose such holdings. 26 Section 13(d)(3) further provides that
"[w]hen two or more persons act.., for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
disposing of securities of an issuer, such ... group shall be deemed a 'person'
for the purposes of this subsection."27 Disclosure is required at five percent
because it "serves . . . as an objective indicator of a potential takeover., 28
Although beneficial ownership is the mechanism with which the Williams Act
24. GAF Corp., 453 F.2d at 717; see also Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853, 854-55, 858, 865 (1971).
25. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (holding that in enacting
section 13(d), "Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management
to... prevent large accumulations of stock .... "). Critics reject the idea that the Williams Act is
an evenhanded statute, and instead argue that management is the beneficiary of the statute. See
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 131 (1987). However, others argue that disclosure erodes away the gains for the
bidder. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV.
597 (1989).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (2006). The extensive amount
of information that the beneficial owner must disclose includes: (1) the identity and background
of the person who acquired the shares "and all other persons by whom or on whose behalf the
purchases have been or are to be effected"; (2) "the source and amount of the funds... used or to
be used in making the purchases"; (3) "if the purpose of the purchases ... is to acquire control of
the business ... any plans or proposals ... to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it
with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate structure";
(4) the total shares owned and the number of shares the person has "a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly," including those "by each associate of such person, giving the background, identity,
residence, and citizenship of each such associate"; and (5) "information as to any contracts,
arrangements, or understandings with any person" regarding the securities, "naming the persons
with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into, and giving
the details thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E). The beneficial owner must provide all this
information in a Schedule 13D to the issuer of the stock and to the SEC within ten days of the
acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3). A "person" for securities law purposes is "a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." 15
U.S.C. § 78c(9).
28. Mark L. Berman, Note, SEC Takeover Regulation under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 580, 586 n.40 (1987).
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pursues the goal of marketplace transparency, Congress left it up to the SEC to
define the term.
29
2. SECRule 13d-3(a)
The 1934 Act grants general rulemaking authority to the SEC to formulate
"rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of [the 1934 Act].",30  The SEC, through Rule 13d-3(a), defined
beneficial ownership as the "power to vote, or to direct the voting of, [a]
security; and/or [i]nvestment power which includes the power to dispose, or to
direct the disposition of, such security."3' The requirement of control for
beneficial ownership is entitled to the level of deference discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.32 because Congress granted the SEC rulemaking
authority for the implementation of section 13(d). 33 The purpose of the SEC's
beneficial-ownership rule was to "provide more objective standards for the
application of [section 13(d) reporting] requirement[s]. 34 Therefore, the
inquiry into beneficial ownership goes beyond determining who has legal title
to the security.
3. Beneficial Ownership Jurisprudence: Requirement of Control
In Wellman v. Dickinson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit considered whether an investment banker who provided account
29. See Disclosure of Corporate Ownership, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,212-13 (Sept. 11, 1975)
[hereinafter 1975 Release].
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)()--(2) (2006). Under federal securities law, the power to
direct means the power to control. See Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Invs. Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 15-16
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding that section 13(d) requires "disclosure of shareholder control"); see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 ("'[C]ontrol' . . . means ... the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise."). Rules 12b-2 and 13d-3 are meant to be construed together. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-1 (stating that the rules "govern all registration statements pursuant to section
12(b)... and all reports filed pursuant to section[] 13").
32. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."); see also SEC v. McNaulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998)
(ruling that the SEC's "interpretations of § 13 and of its own regulations thereunder are entitled to
deference").
33. See 1975 Release, supra note 29.
34. Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,342 (Mar. 3, 1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Release]. The SEC's interpretation is entitled to deference because Congress
did not define "beneficial ownership." The SEC's rule only needs to be "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation" in order to be sustained. Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv.,
411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). However, the SEC cannot create regulations that fail to implement
Congressional objectives. Ernst & Ernst v. Hoehfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).
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management and advice was the beneficial owner of the shares he
supervised.35 In that case, Dickinson conspired with the company's investment
banking firm, Eberstadt, to sell a block of the company's shares to a
corporation interested in waging a proxy war.36 The Second Circuit held that
Eberstadt, and Dickinson as its agent, was the beneficial owner of shares held
in the accounts that the firm managed, as well as those held by the investment
funds it advised, because it actually controlled the disposition of the shares.
37
The court found Dickinson's argument that beneficial ownership requires
control over present voting power unpersuasive. 38 Instead, the court reasoned
that "[t]he power to dispose of a block of securities represents a means for
effecting changes in corporate control in addition to the possession of voting
control. 39  Under Wellman, the ability to exert actual control over stock,
regardless of the form of control, is essential for beneficial ownership.4 °
However, in a separate opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland expressed concern
41
over the lack of clarity in the Williams Act and the accompanying SEC rules.
35. Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1982). The court also addressed
whether Dickinson formed a group for purposes of beneficial ownership disclosure. See infra
Part I.C.
36. Wellman, 682 F.2d at 358. Dickinson was removed as chairman of the board of
directors after losing an internal power struggle with the new management. Id. Interestingly,
Dickinson was the son of one of the company's founders. Id. The trial court aptly observed that
"[tlhe background and governing facts in this complex drama embrace personality conflicts,
animosity, distrust, and corporate politics, as well as a display of ingenuity and sophistication by
brokers, investment bankers and corporate counsel." Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
797-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
37. Wellman, 682 F.2d at 366-67. The court deemed Dickinson, through his investment
banking firm, Eberstadt, the beneficial owner of the discretionary accounts because the firm
"controlled the disposition of the ... shares held in th[o]se accounts." Id. at 366. Further, the
court found that the firm was "always in a position to direct the disposition of the [Funds']
443,200 shares" because the Funds' directors followed the investment firm's recommendations
"as a matter of course." Id.; see also Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1064-66
(D. Del. 1982) (finding that the investment advisor was the beneficial owner of shares held by its
clients, and therefore section 13(d) filing was required because of the ability to direct the votes in
a proxy contest).
38. Wellman, 682 F.2d at 365 ("Although voting control is alone sufficient to support a
finding of beneficial ownership, it need not be the only indicium."). The Wellman decision
predates the application of Rule 13d-3, but the Rule's subsequent implementation further
emphasizes the fallacy of Dickinson's argument for calculating beneficial ownership. Id. at 365
n.12 ("The SEC adopted Rule 13d-3 in February, 1977 but postponed its effective date until April
30, 1978, subsequent to the events involved in this case. Although Rule 13d-3 is not controlling,
it serves as further evidence that the Commission had not intended beneficial ownership to be
defined solely as present voting power.").
39. Id. at 365.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 368 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("When
reputable and honest businessmen, advised by able and ethical lawyers, are held to have violated
a federal statute, the likelihood is that there is something faulty in the statute, the manner in which
it is administered, or both. In this case, I believe the fault lies with both.").
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According to Judge Van Graafeiland, the flaw in Congress's and the SEC's
efforts stemmed from an attempt to "regulate both purchases and sales of stock
with the same set of rules and with an inadequate definition of terms. '42 Judge
Van Graafeiland's concerns would prove accurate with the growing prevalence
of sophisticated derivatives in the modem market.43
In Calvary Holdings, Inc. v. Chandler, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that the legal titleholder of a security who only votes
shares at the direction of a third party is not a beneficial owner under section
13(d).4  In Calvary Holdings, Chandler did not file a Schedule 13D after
becoming the record owner of more than five percent of the outstanding shares
45 46in Diceon Electronics, Inc.45 The transaction included a nominee agreement
that limited the "rights, powers and obligations" of Chandler with respect to
the shares.47 Calvary Holdings, which was involved in a proxy fight with
Diceon, sued Chandler on the theory that beneficial ownership encompasses all
nominees, even if a third party controls the vote.4 8 Relying on legislative
history49 and SEC No-Action letters, 50 the court concluded that nominees with
only ministerial duties are not required to file a Schedule 13D.51 Therefore,
although Chandler was the record owner, he did not beneficially own the stock
because he lacked the control to vote.52
42. Id.
43. See infra Parts I.D.-E.
44. Calvary Holdings, Inc. v. Chandler, 948 F.2d 59, 60 (1st Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 60-61. A corporation that had previously held the stock as nominee for two
directors of Diceon transferred the shares to Chandler. Id.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a "nominee" as "[a] person
designated to act in place of another, usu[ally] in a very limited way" or as "[a] party who holds
bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of
others").
47. Calvary Holdings, 948 F.2d at 61. The undisputed facts established that the nominee
agreement permitted Chandler to vote or dispose of the stock only at the direction of the third
parties. Id. at 62.
48. Id. Calvary Holdings based its argument on Delaware law, which only entitles record
owners to vote. Id.
49. See H.R. 1711, supra note 14, at 2-3 (noting that the Williams Act requires disclosure
by those in a position to alter control of a company).
50. See Rio Grande Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,318, at 79,174 (Apr. 5, 1989) (asserting that trustees of pension
fund were exempted from filing requirements because participants directed the trustees' voting);
Depository Trust Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,192, at 82,243 (Feb. 23, 1989) (asserting that clearinghouses were exempt from filing
requirements); Overseas Shipbuilding Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,374, at 88,768 (Sept. 30, 1977) (asserting that minority
partners were excused from filing requirements because majority partners had all the power to
decide the voting of partnership stock).
51. Calvary Holdings, 948 F.2d at 62.
52. Id. at 64 ("In no way could Chandler, although the record owner of the stock, effectuate
any control over.., management.").
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B. Rule 13d-3(b): A Fine Line between Lawfully Structuring around
Disclosure and Unlawfully Evading the Reporting Requirements
To prevent evasion of beneficial-ownership disclosure, Rule 13d-3(b)
provides that
any person who creates or uses a ... contract, arrangement, or device
with the purpose o[r] effect of divesting such person of beneficial
ownership of a security or preventing the vesting of such beneficial
ownership as part of a plan or scheme to evade the reporting
requirements of section 13(d) . . . shall be deemed to be the
beneficial owner of such security.
53
According to the SEC, an example of a Rule 13d-3(b) violation is a transaction
where a party enters into a "scheme to evade" the reporting requirements to
"avoid[] disclosure of his beneficial ownership."5  The SEC Release
accompanying the rule seems to indicate that beneficial ownership is a
prerequisite for Rule 13d-3(b) liability. However, the dearth of Rule 13d-3(b)
jurisprudence makes it necessary to consider the legality of structuring
contracts to avoid or mitigate disclosure requirements.
1. Conversion Caps
In Levy v. Southbrook International Investments, Ltd., the Second Circuit
addressed whether a "conversion cap" that prevents an investor from acquiring
more than five percent of an underlying security violates Rule 13d-3(b)
Although Levy is primarily a section 16(b) case, 6 Levy argued in the
alternative that the conversion cap was void as an evasion of beneficial-
ownership disclosure under Rule 13d-3(b).57 Levy based this argument on the
theory that the conversion cap was a "sham transaction. 58 Facially, both a
section 16(b) and a section 13(d) argument are relevant because Rule 16a-1
incorporates the Rule 13d-3(a) definition of beneficial ownership. 59 The court
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (2006).
54. See 1977 Release, supra note 34, at 12,347 (emphasis added).
55. Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Inv., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2001). The conversion cap
provided that "Southbrook may not convert shares to the extent that such conversion would result
in Southbrook owning more than 4.9% of ImmunoGen's outstanding common stock." Id.
56. Id. at 13-14 ("[T]he issue presented is whether Southbrook, despite the existence of the
4.9% conversion cap, is a more than 10% beneficial owner of ImmunoGen's common stock.");
see 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006); see also Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305,
308 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[L]iability under section 16(b) does not attach unless the plaintiff proves that
there was (1) a purchase and (2) a sale of securities (3) by an officer or director of the issuer or by
a shareholder who owns more than ten percent of any one class of the issuer's securities (4)
within a six month period.").
57. Levy, 263 F.3d at 12.
58. Id. at 17.
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(a)(1) ("[F]or [the] purposes of determining whether a person
is a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities . . . the term
'beneficial owner' shall mean any person who is deemed a beneficial owner pursuant to section
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held that the conversion cap did not amount to Rule 13d-3(b) evasion and
based its holding on interpretive guidance from the SEC. 60 Levy, therefore,
stands for two propositions: (1) structuring an investment contract to prevent
exceeding the beneficial-ownership threshold does not amount to an evasion of
the reporting requirements, 6 1 and (2) SEC interpretations are entitled todeference. 62
2. "Parking" Schemes
In SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the legal titleholder of stock was
found not to be the beneficial owner because he obtained the shares through a
"parking" scheme. 63  In Drexel Burnham, co-conspirators, attempting to
acquire control of a company, solicited an investor to purchase and hold shares
13(d) of the Act and the rules thereunder.") But cf Egghead.com, Inc. v. Brookhaven Capital
Mgmt. Co., 340 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2003) ("'Beneficial ownership' under SEC rules is defined
differently for different purposes."). In Egghead corn, the court determined that a broad
definition of beneficial ownership comports with the Williams Act's purpose of "alert[ing] the
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, regardless of
technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in corporate control." Id. at 84
(quoting Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001)). Therefore, the
court found that "[n]o serious adverse consequences flow to the holder or owner of such securities
as the result of the broadly inclusive definition of beneficial ownership." Id. at 84 (noting that
"[s]ection 16(b), in contrast, has [the] far more drastic consequence[]" of strict liability).
Although section 16(b) adopts section 13(d)'s definition of beneficial ownership, the court
determined that it applies in a narrower context. Id. ("The rules for determining beneficial
ownership under § 16 are less inclusive than those governing determination of beneficial
ownership for purposes of § 13.").
60. Levy, 263 F.3d at 14 (noting that the court "requested and received an amicus curiae
brief from the [SEC] which provided support for [Southbrook's] position"). A regulation
interpretation by the SEC receives substantial deference. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see also Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d
121, 128 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the court is "bound by the SEC's interpretations of its
regulations in its amicus briefs, unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation[s]"). In Levy, the Second Circuit reasoned that "[b]ecause the SEC's position is
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulations and comports with our
interpretation, we adopt it." Levy, 263 F.3d at 16.
61. Levy, 263 F.3d at 16-18.
62. Id. at 14, 16.
63. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
According to the Second Circuit,
"[s]ecurities parking" essentially involves a purported transfer of ownership in
securities combined with a secret agreement providing the "seller" with the right to
repurchase them at a later date. The "seller" receives the tax benefits of a loss realized
by the "sale"; the "buyer" is compensated for the "cost of carrying" the securities.
Since the agreement to resell ensures that the "seller" never loses control of the
securities, the government considers "parking" a form of tax and securities fraud.
United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L.
REv. 811, 869 (2006) ("Parking involves an understanding that the client will buy the stock back
at a later date and protect its counterparty against loss.").
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of the target company without economic risk until the group was ready to
acquire the stock from him.64  Thus, the court deemed the co-conspirators
beneficial owners of the stock because the agreement between the investor and
the group conferred "a significant ability to affect how voting power or
investment power will be exercised. 65 Drexel Burnham implies that parking
is an unlawful evasion of the beneficial ownership reporting requirements;
therefore, the initiators of the parking scheme are subject to Section 13(d)
disclosure.
66
Likewise, in United States v. Bilzerian, Paul Bilzerian was convicted of
numerous securities law violations, including parking stock at a brokerage firm
in an attempt to create a false appearance of stock ownership.6 7 Specifically,
Bilzerian entered into agreements with broker-dealer Jeffries & Company to
park 58,000 shares of H.H. Robertson Company stock 8 and 306,600 shares of
Armco Steel. 69 Jeffries then purchased additional shares of Armco for its own
account, and promised to aggregate those shares with the original 306,600
shares.
70
3. Structuring to Avoid Legal Requirements Is Not Per Se Illegal
The various exemptions available in federal securities and tax law are
instructive in the analysis of reporting requirement evasion under Rule 13d-
3(b). In SEC v. Sofipoint, the Southern District of New York considered
64. Drexel Burnham, 837 F. Supp. at 591 ("[The investor] reasonably understood that he
was being sought to do a 'parking' job at [the group's] request, and that if he took a position in
[the target company,] he would be 'stopped out', i.e., that he would be 'made whole' if the stock
went down before it was delivered to the source from which the parking had occurred."). The
group initiated the parking scheme because a "Standstill Agreement" prevented the group from
holding more than 24.9% of the target company's shares. Id. at 590. The Standstill Agreement
functioned like the conversion cap discussed in Levy. See supra Part I.B. 1. The court aptly
observed that "[t]o carry out the plan, it was necessary to enlist others in the conspiracy who
would be willing to acquire more than 10% of [the target company's] outstanding voting stock."
Drexel Burnham, 837 F. Supp. at 590. However, the stock price dropped substantially by the
time the group was ready to purchase the solicited investor's shares; thus, the group "sought to set
a price which would not be too high in relation to the market price 'so as to avoid making the
transaction seem ridiculous."' Id. at 592.
65. Id. at 607.
66. Id. at 609.
67. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (2d Cir. 1991). Bilzerian's
convictions were based primarily on misrepresentations on Schedule 13D filings. Id. at 1297
(1934 Act section 10(b) conviction); id at 1299 (18 U.S.C. § 1001 conviction).
68. Id. at 1289-90. Bilzerian promised Jeffries that he would repurchase the stock after 30
days, a textbook parking scheme promise of no market risk for the broker-dealer. Id However,
due to the substantial price drop during the parking period, Bilzerian refused to repurchase the
stock. Id. This refusal generated a $250,000 loss for Jeffries, which Bilzerian compensated by
generating broker commissions. Id. at 1290.
69. Id. at 1289-91.
70. Id. at 1291. In total, Bilzerian purchased 818,900 Armco shares and netted a profit of
$575,000 from the parking and accumulation agreements. Id.
Catholic University Law Review
71whether a stock liquidation scheme qualified for a Regulation S exemption .
The court held that bona fide transactions are exempt under Regulation S, and
that the disclosure "that Softpoint's domestic stock liquidation plan predated
its foreign distributions [revealed] ...a preconceived artifice--designed to
cloak the sale of unregistered securities." Likewise, in SEC v. Corporate
Relations Group, Inc., a Florida federal district court held that the defendants'
scheme was not exempt under Regulation S because it was "a calculated albeit
failed attempt to evade" section 5 of the 1934 Act.73 The courts in Sofipoint
and Corporate Relations Group asserted that securities exemptions are
waivable only if the predominant motivation behind the structuring agreement
suggests bad faith. Therefore, at a minimum, courts arguably cannot
invalidate a disclosure exemption without a motive balancing test.
Exemptions from tax structuring laws can also be illustrative. 75 In Gregory
v. Helvering, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a taxpayer's
motivation of tax avoidance affected the legality of how business transactions
were structured.76  The Court asserted that "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
71. SEC v. Sofipoint, 958 F. Supp. 846, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.901
(2006) (discussing rules for overseas sales). Regulation S only shelters bona fide transactions and
is "not available with respect to any transaction or series of transactions that, although in
technical compliance with these rules, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration
provisions of the [Securities Act of 1933.]" 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 n.2.
72. Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. at 861. The court also determined that the stock liquidation
scheme "fail[ed] to qualify for the safe harbor exemption under Regulation S." Id.
73. SEC v. Corp. Rel. Group, Inc., No. 6:99CV12220RL28KRS, 2003 WL 25570113, at
"16-17 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2003).
74. Id. at * 14; Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. at 861; see also Zimmerman v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 360
F.3d 612, 624 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In order to constitute bad faith, the plaintiffs must show that 'self-
interest or other ulterior motive unrelated to proper regulatory concerns is alleged to constitute the
sole or the dominant reason for the exchange action."' (quoting Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 677 (2d Cir. 1984))).
75. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 130-31 (10th
ed. 2007). To avoid the phenomenon of "double taxation" an eligible corporation may elect to
become an "S Corporation" for tax purposes and receive the "pass-through taxation that is typical
of [partnerships]." Id.
76. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1935). Evelyn Gregory, a taxpayer, was
the sole stockholder of United Mortgage Corporation (United), whose assets included 1000 shares
of the Monitor Securities Corporation (Monitor). Id. at 467. On September 18, 1928, Gregory
organized the Averill Corporation (Averill), in which she was the sole stockholder. Id. Soon
thereafter, United transferred the 1000 Monitor shares to Averill. Id. Less than a week after
being organized, Averill "was dissolved, and liquidated by distributing all its assets, namely, the
Monitor shares, to [Gregory]." Id. Gregory sold the shares for $133,333.33, but reported as
taxable the capital net gain of $76,007.88 (calculated as the selling price less the apportioned cost
of $57,325.45). Id. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue initiated the action, assessing
Gregory's tax liability at the selling price because it was essentially a dividend paid out by
United. Id.
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them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted., 77  Instead of
looking to motive, the Court examined whether the transaction "was the thing
which the statute intended. 78 Under Gregory, taking advantage of exemptions
to avoid paying more taxes is valid, regardless of motive, so long as the
legislation permits it.
7 9
C. Section 13(d) Group: Friends with Beneficial Ownership
Section 13(d)(3) provides that "[w]hen two or more persons act . . . for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such
syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this
subsection." 80 Under SEC Rule 13d-5, a group is formed "[w]hen two or more
persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or
disposing" of securities. 81 This rule does not function to dissuade consultation
between shareholders, 82 but rather the test for group formation is "'whether
there is sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support the inference of a
formal or informal understanding between [members]' for the purpose of
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id. Under these facts the Court determined:
The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B),
was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excluded from consideration the
motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon
its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute.
Id. at 470; see also Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960); Int'l Trading Co. v.
Comm'r, 484 F.2d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[A] taxpayer may achieve benefits under one
section of the Code when what might seem to be the same benefits are denied under another
section.").
79. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2006); see also Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 362 (2d
Cir. 1982) (commenting that section 13(d) "requires a group that has acquired, directly or
indirectly, beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of a registered equity security, to file a
statement with the SEC disclosing, among other things, the identity of its members and the
purpose of its acquisition" (footnote omitted)); S.R. 550, supra note 22, at 8. Section 13(d)(3)
would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the
securities of any issuer from evading the provisions of the statute because no one
individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. The group would be deemed to
have become the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a
class of securities at the time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the group
would be required to file the information called for in section 13(d)(l) within 10 days
after they agree to act together, whether or not any member of the group had acquired
any securities at that time.
H.R. 1711, supra note 14, at 8-9. As of December 22, 1970, section 13(d)(l) was amended to
require filing after the acquisition of five percent. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1, 84 Stat. 1497.
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(l) (2006).
82. Pantry Pride, Inc. v. Rooney, 598 F. Supp. 891, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court
observed that "[s]ection 13(d) allows individuals broad freedom to discuss the possibilities of
future agreements without filing under securities laws." Id. at 900.
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acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities." 83  Evidence of business and
personal relationships and the parties' parallel action alone is insufficient;
84
instead, "the [group] members [must be] combined in furtherance of a common
objective. 85  However, courts may also consider factors such as trading
patterns and past dealings when determining the existence of a group.86
In GAF Corp. v. Milstein, the Second Circuit considered whether a group
linked by a desire to seek control in a company must report such intentions
under section 13(d).87 The group caused a company under its control to
substantially reduce its GAF purchases when it became apparent that the
group's effort to gain a senior management position in GAF was
unsuccessful. 88 The court held that an attempted takeover through the pooling
83. Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982)). The implication of this test is
that a plaintiff can establish the existence of a group without a formal writing from the parties.
Id.; see also Wellman, 682 F.2d at 363 (finding that direct and circumstantial evidence supported
the determination that defendant reached an understanding with others to create a group). The
Second Circuit has acknowledged that it would be rare for a plaintiff to prove group formation
without circumstantial evidence. See Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1994)
("[C]onspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations that can hardly ever be proven by
direct evidence."). The court also considered an allegation that persons acted as a group to be
"analogous to a charge of conspiracy" because "both assert that two or more persons reached an
understanding, explicit or tacit, to act in concert to achieve a common goal." Hallwood Realty
Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F. Supp. 2d 169, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 286 F.3d 613 (2d
Cir. 2002).
84. See Log On Am., Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that general allegations of institutional investors' parallel investments
did not establish a section 13(d) group); see also Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F.
Supp. 1315, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]he unadorned allegation that defendants are acting as a
group is not adequate to sustain a Section 13(d) claim." (citing Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602,
608 (2d Cir. 1972))). Indeed, "[a] close consulting relationship, even when combined with a
possible future acquisition of stock, is insufficient to bring a defendant within the ambit of Rule
13d-3." Morales v. New Valley Corp., 999 F. Supp. 470, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also K-N
Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 767 (D. Colo. 1983) (determining that
information sharing, without more, fails to establish group formation).
85. Wellman, 682 F.2d at 363; see also 146 CONG. REc. 27,176 (2000) (statement of Sen.
Gramm) ("The SEC is directed to focus on the wrong doers rather than provide new paperwork
burden [sic] and regulatory costs on the law abiding [sic] investors and financial services
providers.").
86. Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
87. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1971). The group consisted of
Milstein, his two sons, and his daughter. Id. at 712. The court lamented that it was "not
confronted with the relatively simple concept of legal title, but rather with the amorphous and
occasionally obfuscated concepts of indirect and beneficial ownership which pervade the
securities acts." Id. at 715.
88. Id. at 713. The group's involvement in GAF stemmed from receiving approximately
10.25% convertible preferred stock when a company in which they invested merged into GAF.
Id. Preferred stock-as compared to common stock-is usually non-voting; however, it receives
preference by the payment of dividends. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 75, at 316-17.
However, in GAF, "[t]he convertible preferred stock vote[d] share-for-share with the common
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of holdings triggered the section 13(d) reporting requirements because it
threatened "the stability of the corporate structure." 89 Under GAF, a section
13(d) group is formed where the members combine to potentially exert
changes in corporate control. 90
Likewise, in Wellman v. Dickinson, the Second Circuit found that Dickinson
and "friends" formed a group to shift the corporate control of Becton.9 1 After
Becton's board of directors relieved Dickinson of his position as chairman,
Dickinson and the others agreed to sell their blocks of shares in Becton to a
corporation interested in purchasing a substantial holding in Becton.92 The
court found that the selling group "reached an understanding to act in concert
in disposing of their shares" because Dickinson and friends held themselves
out as a group to potential buyers. 93  Under Dickinson, a court will deem
friends to be the beneficial group owners of cumulative stock if they are linked
by a common objective and make representations that the cumulative stock is
available.
94
Conversely, in Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, the Second
Circuit declined to find that the institutional investors formed a section 13(d)
group.9 5 In Hallwood, the defendants bought company shares during the early-
to mid-1990s. 96 Despite evidence that the defendants discussed Hallwood in
stock. Each share of preferred [was] co[n]vertible into 1.25 shares of common stock." GAF, 453
F.2d at 716 n.13.
89. GAF, 453 F.2d at 717-18 ("A shift in the loci of corporate power and influence is hardly
dependent on an actual transfer of legal title to shares .... ").
90. Id. at 718. But cf Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding
that section 13(d) disclosure requirements are triggered only if the group agrees to acquire
additional shares to further its goal of corporate control).
91. Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that Dickinson and the
others formed a group to achieve the common objective of "profit[ing] from a shift in the
corporate control of Becton").
92. Id. at 358. The defendants found a buyer in Sun Company, Inc. (Sun) and informed
Sun's board that their fifteen percent block of Becton shares was available. Id. at 360. Further,
the defendants indicated that an additional ten to twenty percent of Becton's outstanding shares
could be "readily acquired." Id. Sun executives were aware that the block of shares represented
the group's cumulative holdings. Id.
93. Id. at 363 (finding that the selling group had beneficial ownership of approximately
thirteen percent of Becton's outstanding shares). The court gave substantial weight to the
testimony of William LaPorte, chairman of the board of directors of a company approached with
the takeover proposal. Id. LaPorte testified that a friend of Dickinson indicated that he
"controlled 500,000 shares of Becton and that the shares controlled by Dickinson and [another
friend] were available and would 'go with [the] deal."' Id. (second alteration in original).
94. Id. at 365-66.
95. Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 2002).
96. Id. at 616. Each defendant, except for EFO, independently filed a Schedule 13D when it
acquired more than five percent of the outstanding shares. Id. Defendant PMG actually filed a
Schedule 13G, which is similar to a Schedule 13D, but it may only be filed by a purchaser that
has "no intent to change or influence the issuer or to act in concert with others" who have such an
intent. Id. at 616 n.4.
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meetings between 1994 and 2000, the district court held that Hallwood failed
to prove that the defendants formed a section 13(d) group.97  The court
reasoned that the institutional investors did not form a group because each
"made an independent decision to purchase units, based on due diligence and a
common understanding among knowledgeable investors that Hallwood units
were undervalued. 98  Thus, a group is not formed if friends independently
reach the same investment decision and subsequently discuss investment
strategy.
99
D. Commodity Futures Modernization Act: Congress Attempts to Modernize
Securities Law
The evolution of the financial industry has "created unprecedented
opportunity and complexity for investors, as well as challenges for capital
markets regulators."'  Cognizant of the regulatory uncertainty created by
sophisticated derivatives, Congress sought to clarify the federal securities
reporting requirements through the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (CFMA). 01 After considering the relationship between "security-based
swaps ' 02 and the underlying securities, Congress amended the 1934 Act
through section 3A to provide that "[t]he definition of 'security' [under the
1934 Act] . . . does not include any security-based swap agreement."10 3
97. Id. at 616. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 615.
98. Id. at 616-18.
99. Id. at617-18.
100. Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: Current
Concerns anda Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 833, 833 (2008).
101. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § l(a)(5), 114 Stat.
2763, 2763.
102. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-02, § 206(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1393-94
(1999) (defining a "security-based swap agreement" as a swap agreement where "a material term
is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index of securities,
or any interest therein").
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006); S. 2697-The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000: Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry and the Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 67-68 (2000) [hereinafter S. 2697] (statement of
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve) (testifying that Congress's goal should be to "focus
on insider trading, fraud, manipulation, and make sure that any possibility for those practices to
take place is precluded under the regulatory scheme"). Then-Chairman Greenspan rejected
broader regulation because the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market "is best maintained
with a minimum of regulation." Id. Likewise, then-Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
testified that "[a]s a general matter, we do not believe that swaps should be regulated as
securities" because the CFMA's purpose was "not so as to extend some net of regulation to OTC
derivatives in a way that they are not now subject to regulation, but only to assure that the basic
protections we provide in our cash markets do not become circumvented through this legislation."
S. 2697, supra, at 7, 14 (statement of Lawrence Summers, Secretary of the Treasury); see also
Annette Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Testimony before the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 19, 2000, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts132000.htm. ("[T]he [SEC] by and large has taken action
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Congress also amended the 1934 Act to limit the SEC's rulemaking authority,
forbidding the SEC from imposing reporting requirements on these swaps.
Thus, the SEC cannot regulate modem derivatives such as swaps unless
Congress repeals the CFMA.
E. The Circuit Divide on the Requirement of Beneficial Ownership for Section
13(d) Violations
1. The Southern District of New York: Beneficial Ownership Is Not a
Prerequisite for Section 13(d) Violations
In 2006 and 2007, two hedge funds-The Children's Investment Fund (TCI)
and 3G Fund (3G)- executed cash-settled total return equity swaps (TRSs) 10
5
to invest in a railroad company, CSX.10 6  Judge Kaplan described a TRS
transaction as follows:
Counterparty A-the 'short' party-agrees to pay Counterparty B-
the 'long' party-cash flows based on the performance of a defined
underlying asset in exchange for payments by the long party based
on the interest that accrues at a negotiated rate on an agreed principal
amount (the 'notional amount'). More specifically, Counterparty B,
which may be referred to as the 'total return receiver' or 'guarantor,'
is entitled to receive from Counterparty A the sum of (1) any cash
distributions, such as interest or dividends, that it would have
received had it held the referenced asset, and (2) either (i) an amount
equal to the market appreciation in the value of the referenced asset
over the term of the swap (if the TRS is cash-settled) or, what is
economically the same thing, (ii) the referenced asset in exchange for
its value on the last refixing date before the winding up of the
with respect to swaps only in enforcement cases involving clear instances of fraud."). Despite the
sophistication of swaps, Congress enacted this legislation with an understanding of the
relationship between equity swaps and securities trading. See S. 2697, supra, at 14 (statement of
Lawrence Summers, Secretary of the Treasury) ("[F]unctionally, through a total return swap, one
can do something that is the equivalent of purchasing a share of stock."); id. at 32 (testimony of
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) ("For example, one could potentially avoid
long-established investor and market integrity protections applicable to equity securities by
merely documenting an equity transaction as a 'swap."'); see also 146 CONG. REC. S 11,867
(statement of Sen. Gramm, Chairman, S. Banking Comm.) (emphasizing that the definition of
swap agreement" and "security-based swap agreement" has been placed in a "neutral statute[;]..
that is, legislation that is not specifically a part of a banking, securities or commodities law ...
[that] makes it clear that the SEC is not to impose regulations on such instruments as prophylactic
measures").
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78c-l(b)(3)(A)-(B). The lone exception is the reporting requirements
expressly permitted by section 16. See id § 78c-1(b)(3).
105. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(determining that TRSs are a sophisticated type of derivative that give the holder "substantially
all of the indicia of stock ownership save the formal legal right to vote the shares").
106. Id. at 523-32.
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transaction (if the TRS is settled in kind). Counterparty A, referred
to as the 'total return payer' or 'beneficiary,' is entitled to receive
from Counterparty B (1) an amount equal to the interest at the
negotiated rate that would have been payable had it actually loaned
Counterparty A the notional amount, and (2) any decrease in the
market value of the referenced asset.'
0 7
TRSs were attractive to TCI and 3G because they allow the long party to build
an equity interest in a company without premature marketplace disclosure.
10 8
On the other side, short parties will occasionally purchase shares of the
specified underlying security to hedge10 9 their exposure. 
10
Before investing in CSX, TCI and 3G had "a long-standing relationship." ''
In March 2007, TCI and 3G met to discuss their CSX holdings; the two funds,
along with other individuals, subsequently filed a Schedule 13D on December
19, 2007-which indicated the formation of a section 13(d) group.12
However, "[b]oth disclaimed beneficial ownership of the underlying shares
referenced by their TRSs."" 3 As a result, CSX filed suit alleging, among other
things, violations of section 13(d).114
In CSX v. Children's Investment Fund, the issue before the court was
"whether the holder of a cash-settled equity TRS beneficially owns the
referenced stock held by the short counterparty."' l 5 As an initial matter, the
107. Id at 520.
108. Id.
109. See Oppold, supra note 100, at 834 ("In general, a hedge involves taking a position in
one security and an offsetting position in another security.... Using derivative instruments to
take hedged positions allows investors ideally to limit their downside risk while making a
directional bet that a security will move up or down, or even simply experience volatility.").
110. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE annex 4, at 3
(2007), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp07_20.pdf. Although hedging is an option, the survey
found that "[m]ost [market] participants ...do not necessarily hedge their ...positions by
buying the underlying shares ...." Id.
11I. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 532. The court found that the two funds were familiar with
each other because "Synergy, a fund under the 3G umbrella, has been an investor in TCI since its
beginning." Id. at 532-33.
112. Id. at 534-35. The Schedule 13D disclosed that the funds had "entered into an
agreement to coordinate certain of their efforts with regard [sic] (i) the purchase and sale of
[various shares and instruments] and (ii) the proposal of certain actions and/or transactions to
[CSX]." Id. at 535 (alterations in original). The group further disclosed its cumulative ownership
of actual shares-8.3%---as well as its economic exposure in CSX through swaps. TCI's
exposure was approximately 11% while 3G's was less than 1%. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.at5l8.
115. ld. at 517. The court interpreted the legislative history of the Williams Act as requiring
a broad construction of the definition of beneficial ownership. Id. at 539. The court concluded
that the SEC intended to apply a broad construction in formulating Rule 13d-3a. Id. at 540 ("By
stating that a beneficial owner 'includes' rather than 'means' any person who comes within the
criteria that follow, it made plain that the language that follows does not exhaust the
circumstances in which one might come within the term."). Moreover, the court concluded that
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court found that the TRSs did not confer any voting or disposition rights on
TCI, nor did the swaps require the counterparties to hedge their exposure with
actual CSX shares. 116  After significant analysis," 7 the court declined to
answer the question whether TCI's swaps conferred beneficial ownership.1
8
However, the test for determining beneficial ownership of swaps, found in the
court's dicta, would expand Rule 13d-3(a) beyond a requirement of actual
control. 119 The court proposed a two-part test for triggering section 13(d)
disclosure: (1) whether the swaps considered that the counterparties would
hedge their positions with actual shares, and (2) whether the counterparty had
"a significant ability to affect" the shares' voting or investment power.
To ensure compliance with section 13(d), Rule 13d-3(b) attributes beneficial
ownership to a person who employs a "plan or scheme" to avoid the reporting
requirement.' 2 ' Instead of determining whether TCI's TRSs conferred
beneficial ownership on their own, the court held that "TCI created and used
the TRSs with the purpose and effect of preventing the vesting of beneficial
ownership in TCI as part of a plan or scheme to evade the reporting
requirements of Section 13(d).' 22 After reviewing the language of Rule 13d-
3(b), the court found the evidence "overwhelming" that TCI used TRSs to
avoid section 13(d) disclosure. 123
In reaching this holding, the court rejected the views expressed by the SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance (Division), which concluded that "as a
general matter, a person that does nothing more than enter into an equity swap
should not be found to have engaged in an evasion of the reporting
requirements." 124 The court found the Division's interpretation unpersuasive
the SEC's broad interpretation is furthered by Rule 13d-3b because it was implemented so that
Rule 13d-3(a) "'cannot be circumvented by an arrangement to divest a person of beneficial
ownership or to prevent the vesting of beneficial ownership as part of a plan or scheme to evade
the reporting requirements of section 13(d)."' Id. (quoting 1977 Release, supra note 34, at
12,344).
116. Id. at541.
117. Id. at 539-48 (discussing beneficial ownership generally and applying Rule 13d-3).
118. Id. at 548 ("in this case, it is not essential to decide the beneficial ownership question
under Rule 13d-3(a).").
119. Id. at 540-41.
120. Id. at 541 (noting that the first prong must be satisfied before considering the second
prong).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (2006).
122. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
123. Id. at 548-49. The following evidence influenced the court's decision: (1) TCI's chief
financial officer informed the board that TC1 uses swaps because no disclosure is required; (2)
"TCI emails discussed the need to make certain that its counterparties stayed below 5 percent
physical share ownership . . . to avoid[] triggering a disclosure obligation"; and (3) TCI's
admission that it was partly motivated by a desire to avoid an increase in CSX share price in its
decision to avoid disclosure. Id. at 549.
124. Letter from Brian Breheny, Deputy Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, to
Hon. Lewis A. Kaplan, District Judge, Southern District of New York (June 4, 2008) (on file with
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because its proposed approach would render Rule 13d-3(b) inoperative. 125
Likewise, the court found unpersuasive the argument that the SEC lacks the
power to find beneficial ownership in situations that fall outside the statutory
meaning.126 Therefore, the court in CSX held that beneficial ownership is not a
prerequisite for a Section 13(d) violation. 27
2. The Eleventh and Third Circuits: Beneficial Ownership Is a Necessary
Prerequisite for Section 13(d) Violations
a. The Eleventh Circuit
In Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consolidated Investments,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided whether
beneficial ownership is required for a section 13(d) violation. 128 In that case,
Hemispherx alleged that the defendants agreed to act as a group to vote and
author). Furthermore, the letter expressed the view that "the long party's underlying motive for
entering into the swap transaction generally is not a basis for determining whether there is 'a plan
or scheme to evade."' Id. The Division opined that the test for determining beneficial ownership
under Rule 13d-3(b) for someone who entered into a swap is whether "the person did so with the
intent to create the false appearance of non-ownership of a security." Id.
125. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550 ("An appearance of non-ownership cannot be false unless
one in fact is at least a beneficial owner. That beneficial ownership would satisfy Rule 13d-3(a),
thus making Rule 13d-3(b) superfluous."). The Division's interpretation was not binding on the
court and it found the interpretation unpersuasive. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 234-35 (2001); Gryl ex rel. Shire Pharms. Group PLC v. Shire Pharms. Group PLC, 298
F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 2002).
126. Letter from Bernard Black, Professor, University of Texas School of Law, to Brian G.
Cartwright, General Counsel, Securities Exchange Commission (May 29, 2008) (on file with
author). Professor Black argued that "it must be permissible for an investor to acquire equity
swaps, rather than shares, in part---or indeed entirely-because share ownership is disclosable
under § 13(d) while equity swaps are not." Id. Professor Black's argument is based on the
premise that "the underlying activity must involve holding a position which is 'beneficial
ownership' under the statute (Exchange Act § 13(d) or (g)), but would otherwise fall outside the
rule-outside the SEC's effort to define the concept of beneficial ownership elsewhere in Rule
13d-3." Id. However, the CSX court found that section 23(a) of the 1934 Act grants the SEC the
"'power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of this chapter for which [it is] responsible .... .' CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 551
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1)). Thus, an SEC rule promulgated under section 23(a) is valid if it
is "'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation."' Mourning v. Family Pub.
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 365, 369 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,
280-81 (1969)); see Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,873, 25,875 (July 11, 1986) [hereinafter Amendments to Tender Offer Rules]; see also
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that the purpose of section 13(d)
is "to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities,
regardless of technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in corporate control").
127. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
128. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1361 (11 th
Cir. 2008) ("Whether individuals . . . without a beneficial ownership interest in a company's
securities can nonetheless become members of a 'group' within the meaning of section 13(d)(3)
of the [1934] Act is an issue of first impression in this circuit.").
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dispose of one defendant's Hemispherx shares.' 29 The defendants countered
that beneficial ownership is a prerequisite for being considered a section
13(d)(3) group. 130  The court observed, however, that "[t]he text of sections
13(d)(l) and 13(d)(3) leaves open the question of whether beneficial
ownership of stock is required for group membership within the meaning of
paragraph (d)(3)."' 131 The court additionally noted that Rule 13d-5 also failed
to address the question.'
32
The Eleventh Circuit applied the principles of statutory construction to
decide the issue. 133 The court reasoned that "the goal of section 13(d)(3) is to
prevent persons who already have attained beneficial ownership of some
amount of an issuer's securities from combining to control over five percent of
a class of securities, yet ducking the reporting requirements in section
13(d)(1).', 134  Moreover, the court rejected Hemispherx's position because a
Schedule 13D sufficiently accounts for non-beneficial owners with some
interest in a security.' 35  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "a
129. Id. at 1357 ("Hemispherx claims that by virtue of th[e] agreement between Goemaere
and the South African defendants, the defendants collectively 'controlled' the voting of
Goemaere's shares of Hemispherx and were thus 'beneficial owners' of those shares under
section 13(d) of the [1934] Act.").
130. Id. at 1363.
131. Id.
132. Id. ("Rule 13d-5 provides that when two or more persons act as a section 13(d)(3)
group, each individual member is deemed to beneficially own the securities owned by all of them.
It does not rule out a non-beneficial owner becoming a member of a section 13(d)(3) group and
thereby being treated as a beneficial owner of all of the securities owned by any group member.
Nor does it compel that result. The regulation simply does not say one way or the other.").
133. Id. at 1362. Adhering to the principles of statutory construction, the court restated the
question presented as "whether the context of section 13(d)(3) and the congressional purpose
behind it show that beneficial ownership of securities is required for group membership." Id. at
1363. For a discussion of statutory construction, see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980), which notes that statutory construction begins with the
statute's plain language. However, when the statutory language is unclear, the court "may look
beyond the plain language of a statute at extrinsic materials." CBS, Inc. v. Prime-Time 24 Joint
Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted); see also United
States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1282 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("[Where] the language of the statute
does not clearly answer [the] question... [the court] must look beyond the text and determine the
legislative intent.").
134. Hemispherx, 553 F.3d at 1364 ("That is what section 13(d)(3) is about. That is its
purpose.").
135. Id. at 1364-65. The court held that "[a] person required to make section 13(d)(1)
disclosures must disclose the identity of everyone, including those who are not beneficial owners,
who possesses some form of present or future interest in the securities, along with the details of
the arrangements or understandings with those non-beneficial owners." Id. The court, using the
facts of the case, illustrated this principle by noting that "Goemaere controlled thirty percent of
Hemispherx's stock and was required to file under section 13(d)(1). Although the other
defendants were not required to make a similar filing, Goemaere was obligated to disclose their
identities and the details of any arrangement that he had with them regarding the Hemispherx
stock." Id. at 1365.
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beneficial-ownership interest is necessary to become a member of a group
within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) of the [1934] Act"; and, therefore, a
non-beneficial owner who is a member of a section 13(d) group does not
violate the section 13(d) reporting requirements by not filing a Schedule
13D.
136
b. The Third Circuit
Seven years before Hemispherx, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, addressed the same issue of
whether beneficial ownership is required for disclosure by a section 13(d)
group. 37 After considering the purpose of a section 13(d) group, the Third
Circuit noted that "[t]he implication is, of course, that each member of the
[section 13(d)(3)] group must have something to 'pool.' ' 138 Accordingly, that
something is beneficial ownership. 39 Therefore, the Third Circuit held that a
person cannot become a member of a section 13(d) group without already
being a beneficial owner.' 40  Although Rosenberg goes further than
Hemispherx, both the Third and Eleventh Circuits require beneficial ownership
for a section 13(d) group.
41
II. REJECTING CSX THE MAJORITY APPROACH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IMPROPERLY JUMPED ABOARD THE
REFORM TRAIN
A. CSX: Beneficial Ownership Not Required to Trigger Beneficial-Ownership
Disclosure
The issue before the court in CSX was "whether ... TCI's investments in
cash-settled TRSs referencing CSX shares conferred beneficial ownership of
those shares upon TCI.' 42  As a threshold matter, the court found that the
TRSs did not confer any direct voting or disposition rights on TCI, nor did the
swaps require the counterparties to hedge their exposure with actual CSX
136. Id. at 1363.
137. Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 2001). Similar to Levy,
Rosenberg addressed an alleged section 16(b) violation. Id. at 142; see also Levy v. Southbrook
Int'l Inv., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2001). This distinction is immaterial because the
section 16(b) definition of beneficial ownership incorporates the section 13(d) definition. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
138. Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 145-46.
139. Id. at 146; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2006).
140. Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 146 ("[T]he legislative history accompanying section 13(d)
manifests Congress' intent that an individual must be a beneficial owner of an issuer's securities
prior to becoming a member of a section 13(d) 'group."').
141. Hemispherx, 553 F.3d at 1363 ("Rule 13d-5 ... does not rule out a non-beneficial owner
becoming a member of a section 13(d)(3) group and thereby being treated as a beneficial owner
of all of the securities owned by any group member.").
142. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511,539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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shares.143  The court declined to hold that swaps-on their own-confer
beneficial ownership, departing from the actual-control standard and
announcing a new test that does not require beneficial ownership to violate
section 13(d). 144 The court's two-part test analyzed: (1) whether the swaps
considered that the counterparties would hedge their positions with actual
shares, and (2) whether the counterparty had "a significant ability to affect" the
exercise of voting or investment power.1
45
Although the counterparties had no contractual obligation to hedge, the court
found that the first prong of the test was satisfied because TCI knew it was
possible that the counterparties could hedge their positions by acquiring actual
shares of CSX. 146 Further, the court determined that the second prong was also
satisfied through both voting and investment power.147 The court, in dicta,
suggested that the TRSs satisfied both indicia of beneficial ownership due to
the fact that TCI had indirect investment power over the counterparties' CSX
shares because the counterparties actually hedged the exposure created by the
TRSs. 148 After the transaction was completed, the short party had the ability to
unwind the swaps, whereby the long party could gain actual control of the
shares.149  Because the banks-as counterparties-could dispose of their
hedged shares, the court found that TCI significantly influenced the investment
power of the hedged CSX shares; therefore, TCI beneficially owned those
shares.150 Likewise, the court determined that TCI significantly influenced the
voting power of the hedged shares because it focused on swaps in banks likely
to vote for TCI's directors in a proxy battle.'
15
Instead of determining whether TCI's TRSs conferred beneficial ownership,
the court held that "TCI created and used the TRSs with the purpose and effect
of preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership in TCI as part of a plan or
143. Id. at 541.
144. Id. at 541, 548.
145. Id. at 541. The first prong of the test must be satisfied before considering the second
prong. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 546.
148. Id. at 541-42. The evidence showed that the counterparties hedged their exposure on
'virtually a share-for-share basis." 1d. at 541. The court also determined that the counterparties
could only hedge their positions by purchasing actual CSX shares. Id. at 542.
149. Id. A short party unwinds swaps in kind "by delivery of the shares" to the long party.
Id.
150. Id. at 543. The court observed that TCI's counterparties sold the hedged shares at the
termination of the swap transaction. Id. at 542-43.
151. Id. at 543 ("Between October and November 2007, TCI moved swaps referencing 28.4
million and 18.0 million shares into Deutsche Bank and Citigroup, respectively, while leaving
swaps referencing 1,000 shares with each of its remaining six counterparties."). The court
rejected TCI's argument that it preferred doing swap transactions with commercial banks, which
are government-backed, because they are safer investments. Id.; see Carrick Mollenkamp, HSBC,
the Subprime Seer: Sanguine View Isn't Likely, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2007, at C1 ("Citigroup,
Inc. announced potential write-downs of as much as $I1 billion in the fourth quarter.").
Catholic University Law Review
scheme to evade the reporting requirements of Section 13(d)."',5 2  After
reviewing the language of Rule 13d-3(b), the court found the evidence
"overwhelming" that TCI used TRSs to avoid section 13(d) disclosure.' 53
In reaching this holding, the court rejected the views expressed by the
Division because the court believed the Division's reading would render Rule
13d-3(b) inoperative.' 54 Also unpersuasive was the argument that the SEC
lacks the power to find beneficial ownership in situations that fall outside the
statutory meaning. 155 The court concluded that the SEC regulates swaps under
Rule 13d-3(b), even when the swaps do not amount to beneficial ownership. 56
B. Majority Approach: Beneficial Ownership Is Necessary to Trigger Section
13(d) Reporting Requirements
In Hemispherx, the Eleventh Circuit decided that beneficial ownership is
required for a section 13(d) group.157 This was a novel conclusion because
"[t]he text of sections 13(d)(1) and 13(d)(3) leaves open the question of
whether beneficial ownership of stock is required for group membership within
the meaning of paragraph (d)(3)"; the court also noted that Rule 13d-5 failed to
address the question.' In light of the congressional purpose behind passage
of the Williams Act, the court reasoned that "the goal of section 13(d)(3) is to
prevent persons who already have attained beneficial ownership of some
amount of an issuer's securities from combining to control over five percent of
a class of securities, yet ducking the reporting requirements in section
13(d)(1).', 159 Similarly, the Third Circuit noted that "[t]he implication is, of
course, that each member of the [section 13(d)(3)] group must have something
to 'pool."",160 That "something" is beneficial ownership.' 6  Thus, the objective
152. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
153. Id. at 548-49; see also supra note 123 (discussing the evidence relied on by the court).
154. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550 ("An appearance of non-ownership cannot be false unless
one in fact is at least a beneficial owner. That ownership would satisfy Rule 13d-3(a), thus
making Rule 13d-3(b) superfluous.").
155. See also discussion supra note 126.
156. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
157. Hemispherx Biopharma v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1362 (11 th Cir.
2008). The court observed that "[w]hether individuals.., without a beneficial ownership interest
in a company's securities can nonetheless become members of a 'group' within the meaning of
section 13(d)(3) of the [1934] Act is an issue of first impression in this circuit." Id. at 1361.
158. Id. at 1363 ("Rule 13d-5 ... provides that when two or more persons act as a section
13(d)(3) group, each individual is deemed to beneficially own the securities owned by all of them.
It does not rule out a non-beneficial owner becoming a member of a section 13(d)(3) group and
thereby being treated as a beneficial owner of all of the securities owned by any group member.
Nor does it compel that result. The regulation simply does not say one way or the other.").
159. Id at 1364 ("That is what section 13(d)(3) is about. That is its purpose.").
160. Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2001).
161. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2006).
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requirement of beneficial ownership-actual control-is an essential
prerequisite for section 13(d) liability in these circuits.'
6 2
C. Resolving the Split: The Proper Reformer, the Proper Standard, and the
Proper Action
The resolution of this issue requires determining the proper authority for any
163 i
reform,' the proper standard for beneficial ownership,' and what action is
currently needed in beneficial-ownership law.' 65
1. The Proper Reformer
Although beneficial-ownership law was well settled before CSX, the circuit
split was arguably foreseeable because section 13(d) is "anything but a model
of clarity."' 16 Therefore, the process of statutory interpretation begins with an
examination of "the language of the statute" to determine its plain meaning.
16 7
The inquiry does not stop there; as Judge Learned Hand astutely commented,
"it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence ... to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their
meaning."' 16 8 Congress enacted section 13(d) through the Williams Act with
the purpose of requiring "disclosure of information by persons who have
acquired a substantial interest" in a company's equity securities.16 9 However,
Congress amended the 1934 Act through the CFMA to remove security-based
swap agreements from the definition of security. 10 By specifically excluding
swaps from the definition of security, Congress indicated that swaps do not
implicate the concerns that the Williams Act was enacted to address."'
Furthermore, through the Williams Act, Congress granted authority over
section 13(d) to the SEC. 172 Chevron requires courts to give deference to SEC
interpretations of section 13(d) because Congress delegated that authority to
the SEC. 173 Thus, courts must accept SEC interpretations that are "reasonably
162. Hemispherx, 553 F.3d at 1364; Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 146-47.
163. See infra Part II.C. 1.
164. See infra Part II.C.2.
165. See infra Part II.C.3.
166. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (1971).
167. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 420 (1968).
168. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
169. S.R. 550, supra note 22, at 7; H.R. 1711, supra note 14, at 8.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1(b) (2006).
171. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
172. 1975 Release, supra note 29, at 42,212. The 1934 Act grants general rule-making
authority to the SEC to formulate "rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
implement the provisions of [the 1934 Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a).
173. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) ("If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
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related" to the goals of the Williams Act. 174 Accordingly, any changes to the
well-established beneficial-ownership laws must necessarily come from the
SEC and not the courts.
The Third Circuit applied Chevron deference to the SEC in determining that
the legal titleholder of a security did not beneficially own the shares when he
did not control the shares' vote.175 Conversely, the Southern District of New
York declined to extend Chevron deference to an interpretation of Rule 13d-
3(b) 1 76 Neither case is a traditional Chevron deference situation because the
Third Circuit considered an SEC No-Action Letter 177 and the Southern District
of New York considered a staff interpretation.178
2. The Proper Beneficial-Ownership Standard
In drafting the Williams Act, Congress took "extreme care to avoid tipping
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bids." 179 To further the congressional intent of an evenhanded statute,
disclosure under section 13(d) should only be required in cases of actual
beneficial ownership. A requirement for disclosing at a level less than actual
beneficial ownership would be overregulation and would amount to providing
a sword to corporate management. The expansive definition in CSX comes
from a misreading of Drexel Burnham, which referred to a "'significant ability
to affect' the exercise of voting or investment power. Drexel Burnham
never addressed the merits of a significant-influence standard for beneficial
ownership because the defendants had actual control over the stock through an
express parking scheme. 181 In a parking scheme, the legal titleholder is not the
beneficial owner of the stock because he does not have control over the
shares. 182 Instead, he is holding the stock for someone else-with assurances
of being made whole-so that the parker can illegally deceive the market as to
his total amount of shares. 183 Therefore, the CSX court's reliance on Drexel
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."). Specifically, the Supreme Court asserted that Chevron deference
applies to SEC interpretations of beneficial ownership. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
174. Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
175. Calvary Holdings, Inc. v. Chandler, 948 F.2d 59, 62-64 (1st Cir. 1991).
176. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 549-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
177. Calvary Holdings, 948 F.2d at 63-64.
178. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 549-51, 551 n.205.
179. 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
180. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
181. Id. at590.
182. See United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1990); Drexel Burnham, 837 F.
Supp. at 590-9 1.
183. See Jones, 900 F.2d at 515; Drexel Burnham, 837 F. Supp. at 590-91.
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Burnham was misplaced because the defendant was, in fact, the beneficial
owner of those shares.'
84
3. The Proper Action
Recognizing the novelty of swaps, the CSX court determined that the SEC
had the authority to regulate beneficial ownership in situations that fall outside
of its statutory meaning. 185 Although the SEC is entitled to Chevron deference
in situations where Congress has delegated authority, the court's assessment of
the SEC's power is inaccurate because the CFMA explicitly limited the SEC's
rulemaking authority. 186 In 2004, in accord with the CFMA, the SEC issued
interpretive guidance stating that cash-settled swaps do not implicate beneficial
ownership. 187 This interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference because it is
reasonably related to the Williams Act's goals and is within the authority
delegated by Congress.
It appears that populist calls for reform influenced the Southern District of
New York when it decided CSX.88  Based on this influence, the court
erroneously departed from settled law and rejected the statutory limitation on
SEC authority. This finding has inserted ambiguity into a previously settled
area of law by holding non-beneficial owners liable under the beneficial-
ownership statute and SEC rules. The Second Circuit should reverse CSX or
explicitly limit the holding to the facts of the case. The Second Circuit must
clearly identify an agreement between TCI and one of the banks that represents
a stock parking arrangement for TCI to have actual beneficial ownership. Only
as a beneficial owner could TCI violate section 13(d) and the corresponding
SEC rules.
Any reform to the regulations regarding swaps requires Congress to repeal
the CFMA and clearly expand the SEC's power to regulate reporting
requirements subject to a Chevron deference level of review. If Congress
repeals the CFMA and the SEC subsequently takes a position akin to the court
184. Drexel Burnham, 837 F. Supp. at 609 (noting that the defendant was a beneficial owner
of the shares in question).
185. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
186. See supra Part I.D.
187. Commission Guidance on the Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of
1933, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,240 (June 21, 2002) ("A purchaser of a cash-settled security future ...
would not count the equity securities underlying the contract for purposes of determining whether
he ... is subject to the Regulation 13D reporting requirements, because he ... does not have the
right to acquire beneficial ownership of the underlying security.").
188. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb & David Cho, Hedge Funds Making Way For
Government Regulation, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2009, at D2 ("The new openness to regulation
reflects the desire of investors for a government stamp of approval before they invest their
money."); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
189. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52 (holding that the defendant is a beneficial owner
because the SEC has the "power to treat as beneficial ownership a situation that would not fall
within the statutory meaning of that term").
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in CSX, it would be a drastic break from the SEC's longstanding position. If
the SEC's authority is reinstated, it should reject populist calls for reform
because the beneficial-ownership law currently functions as an evenhanded
statute-as it was intended. Imposing a reporting requirement on long parties
when the short party hedges its swap position with actual shares will impose
exceedingly burdensome disclosure requirements and provide a sword to
management instead of protecting investors.' Further, the overregulation of
swaps will stifle innovation and prevent legitimate, successful market plays by
investors.
III. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO OVERTURN CSX
The Williams Act and the corresponding SEC Rules sought to define
beneficial ownership objectively through an actual control standard.191 Before
CSX, it was well settled that section 13(d) disclosure is only triggered by
beneficial ownership. 192  Imposing the disclosure requirements on non-
beneficial owners is subjective, leads to marketplace uncertainty, and does not
advance the goals of the Williams Act.
A. Ambiguity with Group Status
The significant-influence standard would have reporting implications for
both parties in a swap transaction. CSX held that the long party is the
beneficial owner of the short party's hedged shares because the long party
might significantly influence the short party's voting behavior.' 93 Such a
reading implies that the short party creates beneficial ownership in the long
party simply by hedging its exposure. Extending the analysis, the
counterparties could be deemed a group under Rule 13d-5 because the swaps
essentially are an "agree[ment] to act together for the purpose of... voting" an
issuer's equity securities.' 94 As a group, each counterparty would be required
to file a Schedule 13D disclosing, among other things, all group members.
195
190. See infra Part III.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) ("For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in
securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary ... to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets in such transactions . .
192. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
193. Id. at 545 ("[A] party has voting power over a share under Rule 13d-3(a)(1) if that party
has the 'ability to control or influence the voting ... of the securities .... ' (quoting Interpretive
Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading Exchange Act, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,147, 48,149 n.17 (Oct. 1, 1981))).
194. See supra Part I.C.
195. 17 C.F.R. § 13d-l(a) (2006) ("Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of an equity security . . .shall . . . file . . .a statement containing the
information required by Schedule 13D."); id. § 13d-l(k)(1)(iii) ("Such statement identifies all
such persons, contains the required information with regard to each such person, indicates that
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In a situation where one long party enters into swaps with numerous
counterparties, each counterparty would be expected to disclose the identity of
all other counterparties even if the counterparties do not conduct any business
together or are unaware of each other.
Given the extensive amount of information required to be disclosed in a
Schedule 13D, 196 and the Williams Act's concern of affecting corporate
control, 197 the CSX standard is unduly burdensome and fails to address the
statute's purpose. Furthermore, this analysis is counterintuitive as it eliminates
the requirement that a group was formed in furtherance of a common goal.198
The burden of disclosure might prove to be so taxing and time consuming that
investors forego the financial advantages of swaps and avoid this type of
transaction. 199  This result is not how Congress intended the reporting
requirements to function.
200
B. Unintended Disclosure Under Section 16(b)
The SEC guidance instructs that the long party to a swap does not receive
the beneficial ownership necessary to make him an insider under section 16.201
Section 16(b) requires, among other things, a ten percent beneficial owner of
an equity security to disclose: (1) "the amount of all equity securities of [an]
issuer of which the filing person is the beneficial owner," and (2) an indication
of any "purchases and sales of the security-based swap agreements.20 2
Section 16(b) incorporated the section 13(d) definition of beneficial
ownership, 20 3 and the statutory language of section 16(b) indicates that an
"equity security" is distinct from security-based swap agreements.204  The
former confers beneficial ownership while the latter does not. Unlike section
13(d), Congress explicitly requires disclosure of swaps under certain
such statement is filed on behalf of all such persons, and includes ... their agreement in writing
that such a statement is filed on behalf of each of them.").
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
197. See supra Part I.A. 1.
198. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552 ("'[T]he touchstone of a group within the meaning of
Section 13(d) is that the members combined in furtherance of a common objective."' (quoting
Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982))).
199. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text for an example of the financial advantages
of using swaps.
200. See 146 CONG. REC. S 11,855, S11,867 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
201. See Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-28,869, 35-25,254, 48 SEC Docket 0236 (Feb. 26, 1991)
("As proposed, the rules adopted today define ten percent holders under section 16 as persons
deemed ten percent holders under section 13(d) of the [1934 Act] and the rules thereunder.").
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(3) (2006).
203. See supra note 59.
204. 17 C.F.R. § 3(a)(1l)-I (2008). The definition of equity security in section 16 is
governed by section 3. The term "security-based swap agreements" does not appear in the
definition, implying a distinction between the two terms. Id.
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circumstances in section 16,205 which would suggest that section 13(d) does
not require disclosure of swap agreements.206 However, under the significant-
influence standard, disclosure of swaps would be required under section 13(d).
Thus, a long party would be considered an insider for purposes of section 16
under the CSX standard. This expansive standard of section 13(d) disclosure
would unnecessarily expose traders to strict liability under section 16, even
without actual control over the securities. In other words, the CSX approach
would make a non-beneficial owner liable under two beneficial-ownership
provisions of the 1934 Act, a result that is irreconcilable with either the logic
or the purpose of the Williams Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
When analyzing section 13(d) disclosure issues, it is important to keep in
mind that the purpose of the Williams Act is investor protection. However, the
scope of investor protection is limited to guarding investors from shifts in
corporate control without fair notice. Congress specifically requires disclosure
of at least five percent beneficial ownership because such a level "serves as an
objective indicator of a potential takeover.' 207 By removing swaps from the
definition of security in the CFMA, Congress recognized that swaps do not
trigger the traditional concerns of the Williams Act. Once disclosure is
required under section 13(d), the amount of information the beneficial owner
must report in a Schedule 13D is extensive.
208
Imposing such a burden on a non-beneficial owner, as set forth in CSX, is
contrary to the purpose of the Williams Act. First, instead of protecting
investors, the CSX standard would expose investors to personal liability under
section 16. Moreover, the overregulation of swaps would function as a sword
for management because it gives management investment information
asymmetry. The majority approach, requiring beneficial ownership as a
prerequisite for section 13(d) disclosure, is the only standard that can provide a
shield for investors instead of a sword for management. The Second Circuit
should reverse CSX or clarify that an agreement existed giving TCI beneficial
ownership over the hedged shares. Additionally, the SEC should use its rule-
making authority delegated by Congress to state explicitly that beneficial
ownership is a prerequisite for the section 13(d) disclosure requirements.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (noting that directors, officers, and principal stockholders are
required to file with the SEC under section 16).
206. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) ("'[I]t is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully when it includes particular language
in one section but omits it in another ....' (quoting Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
338 (2004))).
207. Berman, supra note 28, at 586.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l).
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